The Effect of Core Agency Problem on Top Management Team Remuneration under Different Lifecycles
Ya-Chi Chang/Department of Accounting, Tamkang University
You-Cheng Xie/Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between managers’ remuneration and core agency problem in terms of the type of controlling shareholders. Furthermore, this paper incorporates lifecycle perspective as a corporate attribute and investigates the effect core agency on managers’ remuneration in various lifecycle stages. The sample comprises firms traded in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and over the counter (OTC) exchange during 2009-2015. The empirical results indicate that seats deviation has significant positive effect on managers’ remuneration for single family control firms. The findings also show that the relationship between seats deviation and managers’ remuneration is more pronounced for single family control firms in the mature stage than for those in growth stage as well as in the decline stage than for those in growth stage.
Keywords
Core agency problemLifecycleRemuneration
67 Views 11 Downloads